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Editor’s Note 
A shorter version of this article by David 
Mannheimer appeared in the Winter 
2008 print and online issues of the 
Alaska Justice Forum.  It can be found at 
http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/forum/24/ 
4winter2008/a_constitution.html. 
A Comparison of the American and Russian Constitutions 
David Mannheimer 
 The twentieth century English philoso-
pher and archaeologist Robin Collingwood 
held the view that it was impossible to 
understand a system of thought or analysis 
fully until one understood what questions 
the framers of that system were attempting 
to answer.  Collingwood applied this mode 
of inquiry to philosophical studies, but his 
method is equally fruitful when the task is 
to understand the constitutions of nations. 
 In a general sense, of course, the constitu-
tion of every nation addresses itself to the 
same basic issues: 
• How will the government be constituted, 
and how will authority be distributed 
within the government? 
• How will political power be invested in 
leaders, transferred to new leaders, and 
revoked prematurely if need be? 
• What will be the relationship between the 
government and its citizens?  In particu-
lar, what will be the protected rights of 
the citizenry and the corresponding limits 
on the power of the state?  And what will 
be the government’s obligations to its 
citizens, and the citizenry’s obligations 
to the government? 
• What will be the relationship between 
the national government and the various 
sub-levels of government, as well as the 
government’s relationship with the vari-
ous cultural, civic, ethnic, and religious 
groups within society? 
• How will the national income and re-
sources be generated, distributed, and 
regulated? 
Sometimes, the answers to these ques-
tions will be found in the explicit provisions 
of a nation’s constitution;  sometimes, the 
answers to these questions will be found 
in what the constitution does not say.  And 
sometimes (as, for example, the United 
States Constitution’s original provisions 
regarding slavery), a constitution will either 
explicitly or implicitly leave important ques-
tions unanswered—deferring the resolution 
of these issues to later political, or even 
physical, battles. 
But whenever a society asks itself such 
questions, the answers are not written on a 
blank slate. Instead, the political, social, 
economic, and physical conditions that the 
society already faces (or expects to face 
shortly) will ineluctably shape and limit 
the range of potential answers—that is, the 
range of answers that are both feasible and 
acceptable to members of the society. 
The constitutions of the United States 
and the Russian Federation were written half 
a world and more than two hundred years 
apart. Despite this fact, the two constitutions 
appear to be remarkably similar on many 
levels. 
Both provide a framework for nationwide 
governance of a diverse group of constitu-
ent states or regions that are acknowledged 
to be sovereign in their own right. Both 
constitutions establish a federal government 
comprising three independent branches—the 
executive, the legislative, and the judicial.
Both constitutions provide for a bicameral 
legislature: a smaller upper house consist-
ing of two representatives from each state 
or region and a more numerous lower house 
comprising representatives elected by popu-
lar ballot.  (Under the original version of the 
U.S. Constitution, senators were not elected 
by popular ballot; rather, they were chosen 
by the state legislatures.)  Both constitutions 
reject the English system of direct parlia-
mentary control over the executive branch. 
Instead, the American president and the 
Russian president are elected by nationwide 
ballot, separate from the elections for the 
legislature, and the president’s authority is 
designed to be distinct from (and, at times, a 
counterpoise to) the legislature’s authority. 
 Yet these surface similarities mask true 
differences—differences in the explicit 
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provisions of the two constitutions and also 
differences in how seemingly equivalent 
provisions have been put into practice. The 
premise of this essay is that these differences 
can be understood only by studying the polit-
ical, economic, and societal problems faced 
by the American and Russian peoples when 
they formulated their constitutions and by 
understanding the types of responses to these 
problems that were suggested by the two 
nations’ cultural and legal backgrounds. 
The Formulation of 
the U.S. Constitution 
The United States Constitution was writ-
ten in the summer of 1787. It was proposed 
to the states on September 17th, and it went 
into effect nine months later, on June 21, 
1788, when the requisite ninth state, New 
Hampshire, voted to ratify it. As a practical 
matter, however, theAmerican union did not 
become politically secure until the populous 
and commercially important states of Vir-
ginia and New York ratified the Constitution 
later that summer. 
Two hundred thirty years later, we in the 
United States often take this document for 
granted. From a modern perspective, the 
choices made by the drafters assume an air 
of inevitability—as if the provisions of the 
American constitution were self-evident 
rules for governing a democratic society.
We forget that the constitution was ratified 
only after vociferous and passionate de-
bate and that it was forged at a time when 
many Americans distrusted any effort to 
establish a stronger central government, 
when the states often viewed each other as 
rivals, when the four major regions of the 
country—the north, the middle, the south, 
and the west—had very different economic 
interests, and when Americans had many 
differing ideas about how society should be 
organized. 
The American Revolutionary War had 
been fought, not by a true national govern-
ment, but by the joint effort of thirteen 
independent states. Although the states had 
created a national congress and the Conti-
nental Army, the separate states retained 
almost every aspect of fiscal and political 
sovereignty. 
The conclusion of the Revolutionary War 
saw the American states freed from British 
control but still surrounded on all sides by 
territory controlled by the major European 
powers—Great Britain, France, and Spain. 
Under the existing national charter (the 
Articles of Confederation), the American 
national government had no mechanism 
for settling disputes between the states, no 
power to tax, very little power to regulate 
commerce, and essentially no way to engage 
in foreign policy or to fund a war effort 
without the active assent of the wealthiest 
states. 
In addition to this political disarray, 
America had to deal with a looming eco-
nomic disaster. The states (and, as a con-
sequence, the Congress) were running out 
of hard currency, a flood of paper money 
was fueling extreme inflation, and both 
the business and the farm economies were 
foundering. 
In 1786, prompted by the efforts of James 
Madison andAlexander Hamilton, Congress 
issued a call to the states to send delegates 
to a convention to consider a new national 
constitution. Although the need for change 
seemed great, the idea of altering the form 
of the national government was not univer-
sally popular. The political leadership of 
Rhode Island refused to send delegates to 
the constitutional convention, and Patrick 
Henry, the ardent proponent of independence 
and representative government, refused to 
join the Virginia delegation, declaring that 
he “smelt a rat.” The convention’s early 
decision to conduct its debates in secret did 
little to assuage the fears of its critics. 
Madison’s notes of the convention de-
bates reveal a lengthy, and at times seeming-
ly irresolvable, conflict between the larger 
states and the smaller states concerning the 
scope of the new government’s authority, 
and concerning how the states were to be 
represented in that new government—by 
population or with all states represented 
equally. In addition, there was bitter division 
between the northern and southern states on 
the questions of slavery and the regulation 
of navigation and foreign trade. 
It took almost two months for the del-
egates to agree to the compromise that 
Americans now take for granted: a Senate 
with equal representation by state and a 
House of Representatives whose members 
are allotted by population. (To obtain the 
assent of the southern states, the Constitution 
specified that a slave was to be counted as 
three-fifths of a person when determining a 
state’s representation in the House.) With 
the adoption of this compromise, the del-
egates finally became convinced that a new 
constitution was achievable, and they began 
working on the details. 
The proposed constitution was put before 
the states in mid-September 1787. People 
waited to see whether it would garner the 
assent of at least nine states—the minimum 
needed for ratification under Article VII.
People also waited to see whether the consti-
tution would be ratified by the crucial states 
of Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, 
and Virginia. 
By October, a heated debate had started 
up across the country. In public meetings 
and in newspaper articles, the proponents of 
the new government (the Federalists) and 
its opponents (the Anti-Federalists) waged 
a polemical war. Anti-Federalists argued 
that the new constitution undermined state 
sovereignty and that it gave too much power 
to a remote central government. 
(It must be remembered that, in the late 
1700s, the two cities that had served as the 
national capital—New York and Philadel-
phia—were almost as remote as London 
for most Americans. For example, in the 
year 1800, it took president-elect Thomas 
Jefferson three days to travel from his home 
outside of Charlottesville, Virginia to the 
new federal city of Washington, D.C. for 
his inauguration—a geographic distance of 
approximately 100 miles.) 
The Anti-Federalists believed that their 
rights and liberties were better protected if 
primary sovereignty was exercised by state 
governments—governments that were more 
amenable to local pressure and control.
They feared that a strong national govern-
ment, beholden to no state, would allow the 
wealthy and well-born to control the country.
The Anti-Federalists also pointed out that 
the new constitution lacked any provisions 
guaranteeing individual liberties. 
In response, a trio of Federalists (James 
Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John 
Jay) published the series of essays that 
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Papers. In these essays, they pointed out 
the dangers of weak national government 
and the virtues of the type of government 
embodied in the proposed constitution.
Chief among these virtues, they argued, 
was the fact that the proposed constitution 
established several competing organs of 
power within the federal government. This 
principle of divided power—an idea advo-
cated by the French Enlightenment thinker 
Baron Charles-Louis de Montesquieu—is 
now known to us as the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers, or the system of checks and 
balances. 
Five states (Delaware, Pennsylvania, 
New Jersey, Georgia, and Connecticut) 
quickly ratified the new constitution by 
wide margins. But the debate then moved 
to four pivotal states where the outcome 
was much less certain: Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New York, and Virginia. 
In early February 1788, the new consti-
tution squeaked through the Massachusetts 
ratifying convention by a vote of 187 to 
168—only because the Federalists acknowl-
edged the strength of one of the Anti-Feder-
alists’main objections and agreed to append 
a resolution calling for the speedy enactment 
of a national bill of rights. 
Despite the Massachusetts ratification, 
the fate of the new national government 
remained uncertain as the summer of 1788 
approached. The predicted vote (based on 
the announced views of the delegates) was a 
tie in both New Hampshire (52-52) and Vir-
ginia (84-84). The outlook in New York was 
bleak: Nineteen delegates had announced in 
favor of the proposed constitution, and 46 
against. 
But the compromise reached in Mas-
sachusetts—the idea that the constitution 
would be ratified and then speedily amended 
to include a bill of rights—proved sufficient 
to carry the day for the Federalists. 
On June 21st, New Hampshire ratified 
the constitution after five delegates changed 
their minds and decided to vote in favor.
(The vote was 57 to 47.) Four days later, 
and acting without knowledge of the New 
Hampshire vote, Virginia also voted to ratify 
the constitution—89 to 79. 
In early July, Congress received word that 
the requisite number of states had ratified 
the new constitution, and a committee was 
appointed to put it into effect. The crucial 
state of New York, however, had still not 
decided what to do. 
On July 26, 1788, New York held its 
vote. Even though the delegates knew that 
the Constitution had already been ratified 
by nine states (and that a “no” vote would 
leave New York out of the new national 
government), the New York vote was still 
extremely close: 30 to 27, a difference of 
only three votes. Again, it was the promise 
of a bill of rights (and a threat of secession 
by the southern counties of the state) that 
helped procure a Federalist victory. 
The Federalists’promise of a bill of rights 
came to fruition the following year, under 
the guidance of James Madison, who was 
elected to the House of Representatives 
from Virginia. In 1789, the first Congress 
approved and sent to the states the ten 
amendments that we now refer to as the 
Bill of Rights. By December 1791, these 
amendments had been ratified by the requi-
site three-quarters of the states. 
The Formulation of the Constitution 
of the Russian Federation 
The Constitution of the Russian Federa-
tion was written in the fall of 1993, at a time 
of political crisis—an impasse between the 
Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, and the 
Russian Parliament. To explain this crisis, 
it is necessary to back up eight years, to 
1985. 
In 1985, Russia was part of the So-
viet Union—which, legally speaking, was 
a federation of fifteen socialist republics, 
of which Russia was the largest. On paper, 
each republic (and the Union as well) had 
a parliamentary form of government. But 
the real power (in fact, almost total political 
and economic power) lay in the hands of 
the Communist Party—and, ultimately, the 
small group of party leaders who comprised 
the Politburo (the Political Bureau) of the 
party. 
In the spring of 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev 
was selected by the Politburo as the Gen-
eral Secretary of the Communist Party—in 
effect, the ruler of the Soviet Union. Gor-
bachev was heir to a political and economic 
totalitarianism that began with the Bolshevik 
Revolution in November 1917 (late October 
in the Russian calendar—hence it is referred 
to as the October Revolution), and that 
reached its zenith under Joseph Stalin, who 
was undisputed master of the Soviet Union 
from 1928 until his death in 1953. 
In the Soviet Union, the Communist 
Party held a complete monopoly on political 
activity, and it controlled all the structures 
of government. The government, in turn, 
owned all industry and business (except for 
the black market). Essentially every adult in 
the Soviet Union was employed by the state.
Moreover, the types of goods produced, the 
levels of production, and the price of every 
good and service was set by state decree. 
Membership in the Communist Party 
was the path to advancement. The nation 
was run by an elite group of Communist 
political leaders, administrators, and manag-
ers known collectively as the nomenklatura.
Opposition to the Communist Party, or 
hindrance of its leaders or policies, was the 
path to prison, exile, or death for millions 
of Soviet citizens. 
Mikhail Gorbachev was a committed 
Communist, but he wanted to reform the 
economic and political system. During the 
Cold War era, while the world economy was 
being transformed by electronics (comput-
ers, media, and communications), the Soviet 
economy remained focused on heavy indus-
try and the military. As a result, the Soviet 
economy began to stagnate in the 1970s, 
and by the 1980s the Soviet Union could no 
longer bear the cost of its empire. 
Gorbachev set to work to reorganize the 
moribund Soviet economy—a policy that 
became known as perestroika (restructur-
ing). In 1987, at Gorbachev’s direction, 
the government enacted laws that relaxed 
central control over business enterprises, 
allowed private banking, allowed citizens to 
establish private shops and kiosks, and al-
lowed joint economic ventures with Western 
investors. 
But these reforms actually set the Soviet 
economy on a downward spiral. Central 
planning of the economy was gone, but the 
old monopolies still existed, and the exist-
ing pricing system was still irrational (i.e., 
unconnected to the true cost of, or demand 
for, goods and services). The economy got 
worse, and shortages appeared. 
The next year, despite the worsening 
economic situation, Gorbachev began to 
liberalize the political climate in the Soviet 
Union, under the banner of glasnost (open-
ness or liberalization). He encouraged 
open criticism of government actions and 
policies, and he declared that the state itself 
was required to follow the law—that the 
Soviet Union should become a government 
of laws (pravovoe gasudarstva), and not a 
government of arbitrary state power. He also 
suggested that the Communist Party might 
relinquish its leading role—in other words, 
that it should be legal for people to organize 
other political parties. In 1990, Gorbachev 
had the Soviet constitution amended to 
achieve this goal. 
To further advance this new view of the 
Soviet state and to break the power of the 
Communist old guard, Gorbachev revived 
the soviets—the national and provincial 
legislatures that were the remnants of the 
democratic bodies that existed during the 
early stages of the Russian Revolution 
(March to November 1917), before the Bol-
sheviks consolidated their power. (Soviet is 
the Russian word for council.) The Com-
munists had retained these legislatures as a 
parliamentary facade—to rubber-stamp the 
decisions of the Communist leadership—but 
Gorbachev insisted that they again become 
true representative bodies. 
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Gorbachev engineered his own election 
as President of the Supreme Soviet—that is, 
the national parliament—so that his official 
basis for running the country was not his 
position as head of the Communist Party’s 
Politburo, but rather his position as head of 
the parliament. 
Gorbachev’s aim in all of these efforts 
was to steer the Soviet Union toward a new, 
revitalized future—still under Communist 
leadership, but with substantial political 
and economic freedom. This was not to 
be. Instead, the Soviet Union began to fall 
apart. 
The chief architect of its dissolution was 
Boris Yeltsin, a Communist leader who had 
briefly been Moscow party chief and a mem-
ber of the Politburo under Gorbachev—un-
til Gorbachev dismissed him in 1987 for 
criticizing the conservative members of the 
Politburo and the slow pace of reform. 
Gorbachev’s political reforms allowed 
Yeltsin to do something that would have 
been unthinkable under Communist totali-
tarianism: After being dismissed from the 
Politburo (and from his job as Moscow party 
chief), Yeltsin returned to political power de-
spite the wishes of the Soviet leadership. 
With the revival of the provincial legis-
latures, Yeltsin successfully ran for a seat 
in the Russian Soviet (i.e., the Parliament 
of the Russian Republic). And in 1990, he 
was elected speaker of that body. 
In June 1990, under Yeltsin’s leadership, 
the Russian Republic declared that it was a 
sovereign member of the Soviet Union and 
that the laws of the Republic took prece-
dence over the laws of the Soviet Union. In 
other words, there were now two national 
governments laying competing claims to 
sovereignty within Russia. The following 
year, in June 1991, Yeltsin became the first 
democratically elected President of the 
Russian Republic. That same year, the other 
fourteen Soviet republics followed Russia’s 
lead and declared their sovereignty—still 
technically within the framework of the 
Soviet Union. 
The last nail in the coffin of the Soviet 
Union was the Russian Republic’s insistence 
that it controlled all tax revenues generated 
in Russia. By mid-1991, the Soviet govern-
ment was strangling for lack of money. 
At this point, Gorbachev realized that his 
reforms were moving in a direction he had 
not foreseen—the impending collapse of the 
Soviet Union as a unified government. He 
turned to the conservatives to aid him in his 
battles with the resurgent Russian Republic.
But it was too late: The conservatives had 
already decided that Gorbachev was leading 
the Soviet Union to disaster—and that if the 
situation was to be saved, Gorbachev would 
have to go. 
On August 18, 1991, while Gorbachev 
was away from Moscow, vacationing in the 
Crimea, the conservatives staged a coup.
They arrested Gorbachev and held him 
incommunicado. They then attempted to 
re-assert Soviet power. Early in the morn-
ing of August 19th, the official Soviet news 
agency, TASS, announced that Gorbachev 
had “serious health problems” and could 
no longer govern, and that Vice-President 
Gennady Yaneyev had assumed leadership 
of the country. 
But the political situation was beyond the 
plotters’ control. The citizens of Russia— 
and, perhaps more important, the military 
units within Russia—were no longer willing 
to rally to the cause of the Soviet Union. 
The leaders of the coup made the mistake 
of failing to cut off internal communications 
within Russia—allowing the citizens to 
quickly discover what was going on and to 
mobilize resistance. When the coup began, 
Yeltsin was in his dacha in the country.
The coup leaders sent police to arrest him, 
but the police mistakenly went to Yeltsin’s 
apartment in Moscow. This allowed Yeltsin 
to remain free and return to Moscow, where 
he and his supporters barricaded themselves 
inside the Russian House of Parliament, 
known as the White House (Bielyi Dom).
From the White House, Yeltsin maintained 
telephone contact with the rest of Russia— 
indeed, the rest of the world. He denounced 
the coup as unconstitutional, and he called 
for mass resistance from the citizens of Rus-
sia. 
At the command of the coup leaders, 
troops formed a cordon around the Rus-
sian White House. But in between these 
soldiers and the parliament building, tens of 
thousands of protesters assembled to create 
a protective buffer for Yeltsin and the other 
leaders of the Republican government. 
The leaders of the coup now discovered 
that they did not have the undivided support 
of the military. The chief of a tank battalion 
surrounding the White House declared his 
unit’s loyalty to the Republican leadership.
Yeltsin then donned a bullet-proof vest, 
emerged from the barricades, and climbed 
up on one of the tanks, proclaiming defiance 
to the coup. By the end of the day, more 
troops, including an elite commando divi-
sion, were coming over to the Republican 
side. 
The coup leaders now decided to end the 
standoff with an armed assault, but key com-
manders and military units failed to obey 
them. On August 20th, as citizens raised the 
white, blue, and red banner of the Russian 
Republic, the troops surrounding the White 
House abandoned their siege. The coup had 
failed. 
When the coup collapsed, Yeltsin per-
ceived that the remnant of the Soviet 
government was no longer in a position to 
govern, and he began taking steps to have the 
government of the Russian Republic take its 
place as the true sovereign within the Russia 
territory. At the end of August, Yeltsin and 
the Russian Parliament suspended the opera-
tions of the Communist Party within Russia, 
and also seized the Party’s property. 
Without much fanfare, the Soviet Union 
now dissolved. Its constituent republics had 
declared independence; it had no income; 
and it had no military power. In December 
1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist as a 
legal entity. On December 25, Mikhail Gor-
bachev submitted his resignation as head of 
a government that no longer had a territory 
to govern. “Given the current situation,” he 
said, “I am ceasing my activities as president 
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.”
With Gorbachev’s resignation, the Soviet 
Union was gone. The Russian Republic was 
the undisputed sovereign of Russia. 
But this did not mean that all was well 
in Russia. In the fall of 1991, Yeltsin had 
selected economist Yegor Gaidar to lead the 
effort to transform the Russian economy 
into a capitalist economy. Gaidar’s reforms 
soon led to disaster. The economy, already 
weakened by six years of Gorbachev’s half-
measure reforms, rapidly became worse with 
the collapse of the Soviet Union’s inter-re-
public trading structure, as all of the member 
republics declared their independence. 
The downward plunge of the Russian 
economy was catastrophic: Investment 
dropped by half, industrial production 
plummeted, and riotous inflation wiped out 
people’s savings. In the eighteen months 
between January 1992 and June 1993, prices 
rose nearly ten thousand percent. 
This economic turmoil became the major 
factor driving a political wedge between 
Boris Yeltsin and the Russian Parliament.
As the Russian economy collapsed under 
Yeltsin and Gaidar’s new economic reforms, 
the lower house (the Congress of People’s 
Deputies) began to openly criticize Yeltsin’s 
leadership, and his former allies became his 
political enemies. 
One crucial fact of political life in Russia 
was that even though a peaceful revolu-
tion had produced the fall of the Soviet 
Union, that revolution produced remarkably 
little change in the identity of the people 
in power. The former ruling class of the 
Soviet Union—the Communist nomenkla-
tura—was not exiled, imprisoned, or shot.
Instead, the nomenklatura made the switch 
to the new mode of government: They 
acceded to democracy, but they retained 
control over the country’s industry and 
economic resources—and, in the rural areas 
of the country, they continued to exercise 
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effective political control as well. 
(Even the leaders of the August 1991 
coup escaped retribution. Although they 
were soon arrested, they were never brought 
to trial. Instead, in February 1994, the Rus-
sian Parliament passed a law that granted 
them amnesty.) 
Because the nomenklatura was heavily 
represented in the Russian Parliament, one 
major point of contention between Yeltsin 
and his political adversaries was whether 
Russia would have a strong president or 
a strong Parliament. Another major ques-
tion was whether Moscow would remain 
the political center of the Republic. In the 
summer of 1993, various Russian provinces 
and cities began declaring themselves inde-
pendent so that they could take advantage of 
the special privileges granted to the so-called 
autonomous regions under the constitution 
that Russia had inherited from the Soviet 
Union. 
In the spring and summer of 1993, an 
effort was already underway to draft a new 
constitution for Russia, but this effort was 
stymied by the lack of consensus as to what 
kind of government Russia should have. 
The Russian Parliament took the offen-
sive by enacting legislation that rescinded 
privatization, put control of reforms in Par-
liament’s hands, and restricted the powers of 
the president. Once again, there were two 
competing governments in Russia, but this 
time the competitors were the president and 
the Parliament. These two branches of gov-
ernment were in a deadlock, and there was 
no apparent way to end the crisis, because 
the old Soviet-era constitution provided 
that both the president and the Parliament 
were sovereign—but without providing a 
mechanism to resolve their inevitable dif-
ferences. 
In the fall of 1993, while Parliament was 
considering a variety of measures that would 
have reduced Yeltsin to a figurehead presi-
dent, Yeltsin struck first. On September 21, 
he dissolved both houses of Parliament. He 
admitted to the citizenry that the constitution 
did not give him the power to do this, but he 
declared that, because he was “the guarantor 
of the security of our State,” he was “obliged 
to propose a way out of this deadlock,” and 
to “break this ruinous, vicious circle.” 
The Parliament—led by Yeltsin’s vice-
president, Alexander Rutskoi, and Speaker 
Ruslan Khasbulatov—resisted. Parliament 
issued an edict deposing Yeltsin and install-
ing Rutskoi in his place. In response, Yeltsin 
ordered troops to surround the White House 
(i.e., the Parliament building). 
Thus began a siege of the White House 
that was a replay of August 1991. Many 
of the Parliamentary deputies inside the 
building were the same ones who had joined 
Yeltsin in resisting the Communist coup in 
1991—but this time, Yeltsin was the one di-
recting the siege from outside the building. 
Events climaxed two weeks later when 
Speaker Khasbulatov and Vice-President 
Rutskoi sent armed supporters to seize the 
Moscow mayor’s office and a television 
transmitter. Yeltsin responded with greater 
military force—sending tanks to the Par-
liament building and bombarding it with 
cannon shells until it caught fire, thus forc-
ing the surrender of the deputies and their 
supporters. 
Yeltsin now seemed to be firmly in con-
trol of the government. He submitted his 
new constitution to the Russian people—one 
modeled after the French constitution, which 
conferred great power on the president.
On December 12, 1993, in a nationwide 
referendum, this proposed constitution was 
adopted. 
But Yeltsin’s triumph was bittersweet.
He had focused his campaign efforts on 
securing passage of the constitution, while 
his political enemies had focused their at-
tention on control of the Parliament. In the 
parliamentary elections, the Communist 
Party (which was re-legalized in late 1992) 
and the right-wing, ultra-nationalist Liberal 
Democratic party of Vladimir Zhirinovski 
did very well, while the reform parties 
friendly to Yeltsin’s policies did poorly. 
During most of Yeltsin’s tenure as presi-
dent, the Russian Parliament was dominated 
by political parties which were not under 
Yeltsin’s control—and were often implaca-
bly opposed to his policies and his power.
These parties were aided in their opposition 
by the civil liberties that Yeltsin himself had 
institutionalized in the new constitution— 
especially, freedom of speech and of the 
press, freedom to organize politically, and 
legislative immunity. Yeltsin never sought 
to return to the repressive government of 
Soviet days. With the possible exception of 
the eight months between March 1917 (the 
overthrow of the Tsar) and November 1917 
(the Bolshevik takeover), Yeltsin’s years 
in power were the freest and most tolerant 
period that Russia had known up to that 
time. 
A Comparison of the U.S. 
Constitution and Constitution 
of the Russian Federation 
As I mentioned at the beginning of this 
article, the American and Russian constitu-
tions have several important similarities.
Both establish a federal government for a 
group of constituent states or regions that 
are acknowledged to be sovereign in their 
own right. Both constitutions structure the 
federal government in three branches—the 
executive, the legislative, and the judicial.
Both provide for a bicameral legislature: an 
upper house consisting of two representa-
tives from each state or region and a more 
numerous lower house of elected representa-
tives. Finally, both provide for a president 
who is selected by nationwide ballot. 
And yet, there are significant differences 
between the two constitutions. These dif-
ferences are mainly attributable to two fac-
tors: the very different political problems 
facing the two nations when they drafted 
their constitutions and the different political 
traditions that shaped the drafters’ choices 
and emphasis. 
The American constitution was drafted 
as an arm’s-length agreement among these 
thirteen newly independent states. The 
people of these states were clearly linked in 
interest, and while they recognized the need 
for national cooperation, especially in mat-
ters of commerce and defense, they had just 
fought a long and costly war to free them-
selves from a distant king and parliament.
They already enjoyed functioning, repre-
sentative governments in their respective 
states—and many, if not most, Americans 
were distrustful of efforts to establish a new, 
strong, centralized government. Moreover, 
rivalries and conflicts existed between the 
small and large states, between manufac-
turing interests and agricultural interests, 
between the eastern states and the growing 
western populations, and between the slave 
states and the free. Each group feared that 
their opponents would take control of a new 
national government and use that power to 
impose their particular political and eco-
nomic policies. 
To allay these fears and to solve these po-
litical problems, the drafters of theAmerican 
constitution created a federal government 
whose power was intended to be limited 
strictly to the enumerated areas of author-
ity. And to try to protect the states and the 
people from arbitrary or authoritarian use of 
this federal power, the drafters turned to the 
French philosopher Montesquieu’s idea of 
a government containing several competing 
organs of power—a principle now known 
to us as the doctrine of separation of pow-
ers—the system of checks and balances. 
The drafters of the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation faced a strikingly dif-
ferent political problem. 
Russia was already a nation. The eighty-
nine provinces and regions of the Russian 
Federation had been under a unified political 
authority for more than one hundred fifty 
years (first under the tsars, and then under 
Soviet rule), but in 1993, Russia had just 
regained its independence from the recently 
dissolved Soviet Union. The country was 
undergoing extreme political and economic 
turmoil, made intolerable by a stalemate 
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between the presidency and the Parliament.
Because Russia’s existing constitution 
(inherited from Soviet days) declared that 
both the president and the Parliament were 
sovereign, it did not provide a mechanism 
for resolving their inevitable differences.
The people who drafted the Russian consti-
tution in the summer and fall of 1993 were 
motivated by the threat that the federation 
would fall apart. 
On the other hand, the Russian people 
had just emerged from seventy years of 
communist totalitarianism. If the federal 
government was reconstituted so that it had 
sufficient strength to hold the country to-
gether, there was a danger that newly-won 
civil and economic liberties would disap-
pear. 
The drafters’ response was to craft a 
constitution that (1) clearly declared or 
re-affirmed federal supremacy over the con-
stituent provinces and regions; (2) gave the 
presidency great power— to try to make sure 
that the government would not again be par-
alyzed by irreconcilable differences between 
the executive and legislative branches; and 
(3) contained numerous explicit guarantees 
of the civil and economic rights and liberties 
to be enjoyed by Russian citizens. 
Federal Supremacy 
Both the American constitution (Article 
VI) and the Russian (Articles 4, 5, 15, 71, 
76, and 77) explicitly provide for federal 
supremacy within specified spheres of fed-
eral authority. Indeed, it is hard to imagine 
that any federal government could function 
without such supremacy. The two constitu-
tions, however, define that sphere of federal 
authority quite differently. 
In the U.S. Constitution, the areas of 
federal supremacy are primarily set forth in 
Article I, Section 8 (which lists the areas of 
authority that are affirmatively granted to 
Congress), Article I, Section 10 (which lists 
the areas of authority that are prohibited to 
the states), and Article III, Section 2 (which 
lists the types of litigation entrusted to the 
federal courts). 
In general, these provisions give the 
federal government pre-eminent authority 
in matters of interstate and international 
commerce, national defense, and interna-
tional relations. They also give the federal 
courts the power to adjudicate disputes be-
tween states and between states and foreign 
governments. These were the areas where 
Americans most keenly felt the weakness 
of the pre-existing confederation and where 
they perceived the greatest need for a federal 
government able to enforce a nationwide 
uniformity of law and policy. 
Under the Russian constitution, the fed-
eral government is granted a much more 
expansive role. Article 71 gives the federal 
government jurisdiction over some four 
dozen aspects of government, including: 
• “regulation and protection of the rights 
and liberties of [the] citizen;” 
• establishing “procedure[s] for the or-
ganization and activities” of the three 
branches of federal government; 
• “determining…policy and . . . programs 
in the fields of state structure, the econ-
omy, the environment, and the social, 
cultural and national development of the 
Russian Federation;” 
• “federal power grids, . . . federal trans-
port, railways, [and] information and 
communications;” and 
• “law courts; the Procurator’s office; [and] 
criminal [and] criminal procedure . . . 
legislation[.]” 
Moreover, Article 72 of the Russian con-
stitution gives the federal government and 
the provincial/regional governments joint 
jurisdiction over many other governmental 
functions, including: 
• “issues [concerning] the possession, 
use, and management of land, mineral 
resources, water, and other natural re-
sources;” 
• “protection of the environment and eco-
logical safety;” 
• “general questions of upbringing, educa-
tion, science, culture, physical culture, 
and sports;” 
• “coordination of health issues, protection 
of the family, motherhood, fatherhood, 
and childhood, [and] social protection 
including social security;” 
• “administrative, . . . labor, family, hous-
ing, land, water, and forestry legisla-
tion;” 
• “[the membership of] the judiciary and 
law-enforcement agencies, the bar, [and 
the] notariate;” and 
• “establishment of general guidelines for 
the organization of . . . bodies of state 
power and local self-government.” 
Although Article 72 declares that these 
foregoing concerns fall within the joint 
authority of the federal and the provincial/ 
regional governments, Article 76 states that, 
in these areas of joint jurisdiction, “federal 
laws shall be issued and, in accordance with 
them, laws and other regulatory acts of [the 
constituent provinces, and regions] shall 
be adopted.” In other words, the federal 
government’s laws on these matters are 
controlling. 
The Presidency 
Both the American and the Russian 
constitutions provide for a president to be 
elected by nationwide popular vote, but 
while the American contains a detailed de-
scription of the powers (and the limitations 
on the power) of Congress, it devotes very 
little space to defining the authority of the 
president. The Russian, on the other hand, 
contains a lengthy description of the powers 
of the president and very little description of 
the authority of the Parliament. 
The powers of theAmerican president are 
set forth in Article II, Sections 2 and 3. The 
president is the commander-in-chief of the 
armed forces (and of the state militias, “if 
they have been called into the service of the 
United States”). In addition, the president 
has the authority to appoint, with the con-
sent of the Senate, all officers of the federal 
government (i.e., all officers whose manner 
of selection is not otherwise specified in the 
constitution). (Article II, Section 2 allows 
Congress to enact statutes that eliminate the 
requirement of Senate approval for specific 
federal officers and that authorize the “Heads 
of Departments” or the “Courts of Law” to 
appoint certain federal officers instead of the 
president.) 
Beyond this, the American president 
is empowered (1) to require the principal 
heads of the departments of the federal 
government to report on any subject relat-
ing to their duties, (2) to grant pardons and 
reprieves, (3) to convene the Congress “on 
extraordinary occasions,” and (4) to “receive 
ambassadors and other public ministers [of 
foreign countries].” The president is also 
directed to “take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed.” 
In contrast, Article 80 of the Russian 
constitution declares that the president “shall 
be the head of state” and “the guarantor 
of the Constitution . . . and of human and 
civil rights and freedoms.” The president 
is directed to “take measures to protect the 
sovereignty of the Russian Federation, its 
independence and [its] state integrity,” to 
“ensure concerted functioning and inter-
action of all bodies of state power,” and 
to “define the basic domestic and foreign 
policy guidelines of the state.” 
Under Article 83, the president has com-
plete power to appoint all officers of the fed-
eral government except the prime minister 
(an office described as the “Chairman of the 
Government of the Russian Federation”).
Article 83 specifies that the Duma (i.e., the 
lower house of Parliament) must consent to 
the president’s choice for prime minister. 
However, under Article 111, if the Duma 
refuses to accept the president’s nominee 
for prime minister three times in succes-
sion, the president is authorized to appoint 
the prime minister unilaterally, dissolve the 
Duma, and call for new elections. Similarly, 
under Article 117, if the Duma gives a vote 
of “no confidence” in the prime minister’s 
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government twice in a three-month period, 
the president is given the choice of either 
dismissing the government or dismissing 
the Duma and calling for new elections. 
Article 85 gives the president the power 
to suspend the operation of a law “pending 
the resolution of the issue in the appropriate 
court” if the president believes that a law 
passed by a constituent province or region 
violates the federal constitution or any fed-
eral law or that it violates “human and civil 
rights and liberties.” 
And under Article 90, the president is 
empowered to “issue decrees and execu-
tive orders [that are] binding throughout the 
territory of the Russian Federa-tion,” so 
long as these decrees and orders “[do] not 
contravene the Constitution . . . or federal 
laws.” 
The Rights of Citizens 
Americans are justly proud of our Bill 
of Rights—the first ten amendments to the 
United States Constitution, which deal with 
issues such as freedom of speech, freedom 
of the press, freedom from unreasonable 
government searches and seizures, the right 
to jury trial, the right to the assistance of 
counsel and to confront government wit-
nesses in criminal cases, and the right to 
fair compensation when the government 
exercises its authority to take private prop-
erty. The Russian constitution, however, 
guarantees a far greater array of liberties 
and rights for its citizens. 
It would be a mistake to view the Ameri-
can Bill of Rights through a twenty-first 
century lens: These ten amendments were 
not intended to be federal guarantees of in-
dividual liberties in the sense that the federal 
govern-ment could enforce these liberties 
on the states. Rather, when the Bill of 
Rights was proposed and adopted in the late 
1700s, it was seen as a series of restrictions 
on federal power—measures designed to 
make sure that the new federal government 
could do nothing to alter state law on these 
subjects. It was designed to prohibit the 
federal government from otherwise infring-
ing the rights that Americans believed they 
had inherited from English common law. 
For instance, the First Amendment 
prohibits the Congress from establishing a 
religion—i.e., selecting a religion to be of-
ficially favored by the federal government, 
which could be supported by federal taxes 
(in other words, money taken from people 
who did not necessarily agree with that 
religion). This provision was viewed as a 
salutary limit on federal power, but it was not 
intended to apply to the states. At the time 
the United States Constitution was adopted 
(and until 1818), the State of Connecticut 
was, in many respects, a theocracy. The 
Congrega-tionalist Church was the estab-
lished church, and all citizens were obliged 
to support it. No one thought that the enact-
ment of the First Amendment required any 
change in Connecticut’s state government. 
It would take two more centuries—en-
compassing a civil war, the enactment of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and a series of 
Supreme Court decisions in the 1950s and 
1960s—before the Bill of Rights would 
assume its modern role in American law 
as a set of federally guaranteed rights and 
liberties. 
In contrast, the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation explicitly commits 
the federal government to protect a whole 
panoply of civic rights and benefits—and 
not just political and religious rights. The 
Russian constitution also guarantees the 
types of economic and social benefits that 
Russian citizens received (or, at least, were 
theoretically entitled to) under the socialist 
framework of the Soviet Union. 
Many of the rights guaranteed by the 
Russian constitution correspond to rights 
that Americans have come to expect under 
the Bill of Rights. 
For instance, Article 14 guarantees that 
there will be no state-sponsored or manda-
tory religion, and Article 28 guarantees an 
individual’s right to practice any religion, 
“or to profess no religion.” Article 13 
guarantees “ideological pluralism;” in other 
words, it guarantees that there will be no 
state-sponsored or mandatory political/so-
cial ideology (as there was under the days of 
Soviet rule). Similarly, Article 30 protects 
the right of association—both political as-
sociation and economic association (e.g., 
trade unions). Again, to prevent a return 
to Soviet practices, Article 30 declares that 
“[n]o one may be coerced into joining any 
association.” 
Article 29 guarantees “freedom of speech 
and thought”—although it expressly forbids 
“[p]ropaganda or campaigning to incite so-
cial, racial, national, or religious hatred and 
strife.” This same article also guarantees 
freedom of the media, it forbids censorship, 
and it guarantees public access to infor-
mation. Article 44 guarantees “freedom 
of literary, artistic, scientific, intellectual, 
and other . . . creative activity.” Article 31 
guarantees the right to assemble peaceably 
and to hold political meetings, rallies, and 
demonstrations. Article 33 guarantees the 
right to petition the government. 
Articles 19 and 32 guarantee the legal 
equality of all people. Article 19 commits 
the federal government to be the guarantor 
of “the equality of rights and liberties re-
gardless of sex, race, nationality, language, 
origin, property or employment status, 
residence, attitude to religion, convictions, 
membership of public associations or any 
other circumstance.” Article 32 guarantees 
all citizens equal access to state services and 
the right to participate in government. 
Article 22 guarantees an individual’s 
right to “freedom and personal inviolabil-
ity,” and it declares that the government 
cannot hold a person in custody for more 
than forty-eight hours without a court order.
Article 23 guarantees the right to privacy, 
and it provides that the government cannot 
infringe the privacy of “correspondence, 
telephone communications . . . and other 
communications” without a court order. 
Article 25 states that the government 
cannot “enter a home against the will of the 
persons residing in it except under a court 
order or in other instances provided by fed-
eral law.” 
Articles 46 and 47 guarantee equal access 
to the courts as well as judicial protection 
of citizens’ rights. Article 48 guarantees the 
right to counsel, and Article 49 guarantees 
the presumption of innocence in criminal 
cases. Article 51 guarantees the right against 
self-incrimination. Article 50 forbids re-
peated conviction for the same offense, and 
it also guarantees defendants the benefit of 
the exclusionary rule: the government can-
not rely on “evidence obtained in violation 
of federal law.” Article 54 forbids ex post 
facto laws. 
Articles 35, 36, and 44 guarantee the right 
to hold private property (including land and 
intellectual property) as well as the right of 
inheritance. Article 35 also guarantees fair 
compensation for people whose property is 
taken by the government. And Article 37 
forbids forced labor—similar to the Ameri-
can Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on 
“involuntary servitude.” 
While these constitutionally guaranteed 
rights are familiar to Americans, the Rus-
sian constitution also protects many other 
rights that are not found in, or at least are 
not explicitly guaranteed by, the American 
constitution. 
Article 24 declares that it is forbidden “to 
gather, store, use, or disseminate information 
on the private life of any person without his 
or her consent.” 
Article 21 declares that no person shall 
be subjected to torture “or any other harsh 
or humiliating treatment,” nor “subjected 
to medical, scientific, or other experiments 
without his or her free consent.” 
Article 26 guarantees all citizens the right 
to choose their “national identity”—that is, 
the right to decide their racial or ethnic af-
filiation (instead of having the government 
decide this). 
Articles 34 and 37 guarantee the right of 
private enterprise and the right to choose 
one’s occupation freely. 
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Article 37 also guarantees the right to 
work under safe and hygienic conditions and 
forbids wage discrimination. It guarantees 
“the right to rest and leisure,” by requiring 
all work contracts to adhere to federal law 
regarding the maximum work week, days off 
and holidays, and paid, annual vacation. 
In addition,Article 57 contains an ex post 
facto clause that restricts the government’s 
authority to tax: “Laws instituting new taxes 
or worsening the condition of tax payers 
shall not have retroactive force.” 
Article 27 guarantees freedom of move-
ment and residence within the Russian Fed-
eration, as well as the right to travel outside 
the Russian Federation (and to return from 
these travels). 
A series of constitutional provisions 
guarantee a social safety net to all Russian 
citizens. Article 39 guarantees social se-
curity payments to people in their old age, 
and it also guarantees payments to people in 
financial need because of “disease, loss of a 
breadwinner, [or the need] to bring up chil-
dren.” Article 40 guarantees a home—that 
is, a place to live—to all citizens, and it 
requires the government to provide hous-
ing to people who cannot afford it. Article 
43 guarantees all children the right to an 
education through secondary school and the 
right to free higher education if they pass a 
competitive entrance examination. 
Article 41 guarantees the right to health 
care and medical services. Article 42 com-
mits the government to provide compensa-
tion to people who have been injured or 
who suffer ill health because of violations 
of environmental laws. 
Article 52 guarantees the rights of crime 
victims—both the right of “access to justice” 
and the right to receive “compensation for 
injury.” 
AlthoughArticle 68 declares that Russian 
is the state language of the Russian Federa-
tion, this same article also guarantees other 
ethnic groups “the right to preserve their 
native language and to create the conditions 
for its study and development.” 
Article 61 guarantees Russian citizens 
that they will not be extradited to another 
country, and Article 63 forbids the federal 
government from extraditing a non-Russian 
citizen to another country if that person is 
being persecuted for political views or fac-
ing prosecution for “actions (or inaction) 
that would not qualify as criminal under the 
law of the Russian Federation.” 
The American Emphasis on Procedure 
There is one more distinction between 
the American and Russian constitutions 
that should be discussed: the American’s 
emphasis on matters of procedure. 
As explained earlier, the American con-
stitution created a federal government that 
was founded on the doctrine of separation of 
powers or checks and balances. To imple-
ment this doctrine, the American drafters 
relied on a legal premise inherited from 
England—the premise that, in the long run, 
fairness is ensured by the procedures that 
decision-makers must follow, rather than by 
the identities of the decision-makers. 
If you examine the United States Con-
stitution as it was originally submitted to 
the states (that is, before the addition of the 
Bill of Rights), you will discover that more 
than half of the text is devoted to matters of 
procedure—how the Congress, the presi-
dent, and the judges of the federal courts 
are to be selected and removed from office; 
the procedural rules under which these three 
branches (especially the Congress) are to 
operate; and the methods for amending the 
constitution in the future. 
This emphasis on details of procedure 
(especially the details regarding the selec-
tion of senators, representatives, and the 
president) is directly attributable to the long 
tradition of parliamentary government inher-
ited from England, as well as the drafters’
belief that procedural rules would provide 
a crucial guarantee that the states would not 
be overwhelmed by the federal government 
and that different states and political factions 
would always have their fair opportunity to 
influence the federal government. 
The Russian constitution is different in 
this regard. The Russian drafters had no 
corresponding tradition of parliamentary 
government and procedural guarantees to 
draw from—because the preceding seventy 
years of Soviet rule, and the three-and-a-half 
centuries of tsarist rule before that, were 
characterized by the arbitrary and dictatorial 
use of state power rather than legislative rule 
and procedural regularity. 
Not until 1988—that is, only five years 
before the drafting of the Russian constitu-
tion—did Mikhail Gorbachev advocate 
reforming the Soviet Union into a govern-
ment of laws (pravovoe gasudarstva). This 
goal—the rule of law—is explicitly embod-
ied in Articles 1, 3, 11, and 15. The drafters, 
however, were not sure what this rule of law 
would look like, so they left many important 
details to future development. 
Thus, for example,Article 77 declares that 
“federal law”—that is, statutory law—will 
control the “organization of the legislative 
and executive [branches of government]” in 
the constituent provinces and regions of the 
Russian Federation. 
Article 78 authorizes the executive 
branch of the federal government to “set 
up their own territorial structures [i.e., gov-
ernmental districts] and appoint respective 
officials [for these districts].” 
Under Article 81, “[t]he procedure for 
electing the President of the Russian Federa-
tion shall be determined by federal law.” 
Article 95 provides for a bicameral leg-
islature. It declares that the upper house 
(the Federation Council) comprises two 
representatives from each province and 
region—one from the legislative branch 
and one from the executive branch—but 
it does not further specify their manner of 
selection. Similarly, Article 95 declares that 
the lower house (the Duma) consists of 450 
elected deputies—but, again, it does not 
further specify the manner of their selection.
Instead, the following article (Article 96) 
declares that “[t]he procedure for forming 
the Federation Council and the procedure 
for electing deputies to the State Duma shall 
be established by federal law.” 
Article 114 enumerates the various 
powers of the Russian federal government, 
but the last clause declares that the federal 
government shall also “exercise any other 
powers vested in it by . . . federal laws [or] 
the decrees of the President of the Russian 
Federation.” 
Article 128 specifies that the judges of the 
Russian Federation’s three highest courts— 
the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, 
and the Supreme Commercial (Arbitrazh) 
Court—are nominated by the president and 
confirmed by the Federation Council. But all 
other judges in the Russian Federation “shall 
be appointed by the President of the Russian 
Federation in accordance with procedures 
established by federal law.” Moreover, 
Article 121 states that a judge’s powers 
may be terminated or suspended “under 
procedures and on grounds established by 
federal law.” 
In other words, the Russian constitution 
is much more open-ended on the questions 
of how federal officials are to be selected, 
what tenure these officials will have, how 
the federal and provincial/regional govern-
ments are to be organized, and what powers 
the federal government will wield. 
* * * 
My aim in this essay has been to compare 
the American and Russian constitutions, but 
not to assess their relative worth, since each 
constitution has bequeathed both benefits 
and problems to the nation that adopted 
it. Rather, my hope has been to point out 
that each constitution reflects the drafters’
earnest attempt to address the major po-
litical problems confronting their society at 
the time. The solutions embodied in each 
constitution were shaped by the political, 
social, and economic tools that history and 
culture had provided to each country. 
David Mannheimer sits on the Alaska 
Court of Appeals. 
